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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1304 
_____________ 
 
KENNETH J. WILLIAMS, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MR. DONALD T. VAUGHN; DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR LEHIGH 
COUNTY; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-95-cv-07977 
District Judge: The Honorable Jan E. Dubois 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2012 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 13, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 In 1985, Kenneth J. Williams was convicted by a jury of first degree murder 
and was sentenced to death.  On December 26, 1995, after unsuccessfully 
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appealing his conviction and sentence, Williams petitioned for post-conviction 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), raising claims 
concerning the guilt phase as well as the penalty phase of his trial.  On December 
27, 1995, Williams filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a parallel petition 
for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  This federal petition was quickly 
dismissed without prejudice. 
On October 17, 2003, after years of litigation in state court concerning the 
timeliness of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court granted his petition as to his 
penalty phase claims.  The court granted Williams a new penalty phase.  The 
PCRA court rejected, however, all of Williams’s guilt phase claims.  The PCRA 
court’s decision was appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the 
decision and remanded for reconsideration.  On remand, the PCRA Court again 
granted Williams’ PCRA petition as to his penalty phase claims, but denied his 
petition as to his guilt phase claims.  On June 17, 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed this second decision.  At Williams’s resentencing, Williams 
received a life sentence.  He did not appeal this new sentence.   
On December 14, 2009, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the 
PCRA court’s decision, Williams filed a motion to reactivate his federal habeas 
proceeding, and to file an amended habeas petition under § 2254 focusing 
exclusively on his guilt phase claims.  On February 8, 2010, the District Court 
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granted Williams’s motion, and deemed his amended habeas petition filed nunc 
pro tunc to December 14, 2009.   
The District Court referred Williams’s petition to a Magistrate Judge, who 
recommended that the petition be denied. Williams filed written objections to the 
Magistrate’s report and recommendation.  On January 11, 2011, the District Court 
rejected Williams’s objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, and dismissed Williams’s petition.  The District Court declined 
to issue a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 
Williams filed a timely appeal, along with a motion for a certificate of 
appealability.  A panel of this court granted Williams a certificate of appealability 
as to two issues:  (1) whether Williams was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel at a “critical” stage prior to trial; and (2) whether an informal 
conference with the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated 
Williams’s right to due process.1
Because the District Court “relied exclusively on the state court record and 
did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary.”  Palmer v. Hendricks, 
592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010).  “We review the decision of the state court under 
the same standard that the District Court was required to apply.”  Saranchak v. 
 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254.  This court 
has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253. 
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Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).  A district court’s authority to review a 
state court’s denial of post-conviction relief is limited by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  
Because the PCRA Court denied Williams’s guilt phase claims on the merits, we 
may grant habeas relief only if the PCRA Court’s adjudication of Williams’s 
claims “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or . . . in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 First, “a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of 
his trial.”  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).  Williams argues 
that he was denied his right to counsel when he was nominally represented by the 
Lehigh County Public Defender’s Office while they were actively trying to 
withdraw from the case.  He further argues that this was a critical stage of his case 
because it was during this period that the court set a firm date for his trial, and 
thus that he was denied his constitutional rights.   
A critical stage is “every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial 
rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”  Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 
(1967).  The PCRA Court concluded that “[t]he setting of a trial date is a 
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ministerial matter . . . and does not remotely constitute a critical stage.”  App’x A-
133.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed.  App’x A-93.  Williams has not 
shown that this conclusion was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2
Second, Williams argues that an informal conference with the Chief Justice 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated his due process rights because the 
party who petitioned for the hearing “failed to properly invoke the court’s 
jurisdiction,” and because “the decisions to substitute counsel and to provide the 
new lawyer with a mere 21 days to prepare were made in these improperly 
conducted proceedings.”  Appellant’s Br. at 27.   
   
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the “Chief Justice did not 
make any definitive ruling” at the conference.  App’x A-93.3
                                                 
2 Williams cites extensively to Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 522 (3d Cir. 1996), in 
support of his argument.  Yohn, however, was not “determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States,” and is thus not sufficient to overcome § 2254(d)(1).  
See Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 630 (3d Cir. 2011). 
  Because no 
definitive ruling with respect to the trial date was made at the conference, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, there was no due process violation 
 
3 This factual finding was not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” and we are bound 
to accept the finding.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).   
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“regardless of the technical propriety of the proceedings . . . .”  Id.  We agree—
assuming, without deciding that the hearing was technically inappropriate, it did 
not result in a definitive ruling, and any resulting error was harmless.4
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
   
 
 
                                                 
4 Williams argues that this alleged error is a “structural” error not subject to 
harmless error review.  We disagree.  Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
finding that no definitive ruling was made at the conference, any error arising out 
of that hearing did not “infect the entire trial process,” and thus was merely a 
“trial” error.  See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-51 
(2006) (discussing the difference between trial error and structural error); Palmer 
v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 2010) (same). 
